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RIGHTS OF MENTALLY ILL-INVOLUNTARY
STERILIZATION-ANALYSIS OF RECENT
STATUTES
With the enactment of an involuntary sterilization procedure
for use upon the mentally incompetent, West Virginia has placed
itself in a bare majority of states that regulate such a treatment.
Twenty-six states currently regulate involuntary sterilization by
statute; however, the classification of individuals that fall within
the statutory boundaries varies widely. Specifically, four states
deal only with the feeble-minded and the insane,' seven others add
epileptics to this class,2 whereas Mississippi omits the insane,
administering only to feeble-mindeds and hereditary epileptics.'
Two states restrict the procedure to the feeble-minded only,, one
to certain classifications of criminals only,5 and two include crimi-
nal offenders with the feeble-minded and insane (omitting epilep-
tics).' Six states include all four classes,7 and two states have re-
pealed their sterilization statutes.8 West Virginia's statutory clas-
sification is unique in that it uses only the broad term "mentally
incompetent" to bring the patient within its parameters.9
In the only sterilization case to reach the United States Su-
preme Court, Buck v. Bell, the sterilization statute of Virginia was
upheld as constitutionally valid.'" The Court emphasized that in
order for a statute of this nature to be valid, its provisions must
I ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-501 to -02 (1971 Rep. Vol.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
34 §§ 2461 -68 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.381 - .390 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. §§ 27-11-1 to -6, §§ 27-17-1 to -34 (1967).
2 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-531 to -540 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§
5701-05 (1975); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-13-13-1 to -6, 16-13-14-1 to -5 (1973); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 38-601 to -08 (1947); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 174:1 to :14
(1964); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-671 -80 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-156 -71 (1970
Rep. Vol.).
3 Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1972).
' IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 to -10 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256.07 (1971).
5 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.92.100 (1961).
6 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2670 (Deering 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-
19 (1975).
1 IOWA CODE ANN. § 145.9 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 (1966); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 341-46 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 436.010 -.090 (1973 Rep. Vol.);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1 to -14 (1953); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 46.12 (1957).
1 NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-501 (repealed 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-08-01 to -
15 (repealed 1965).
9 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-16-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
10 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1926).
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be very carefully drawn to meet stringent standards of due pro-
cess-guaranteeing all citizens an impartial adjudication by a tri-
bunal vested with lawful authority and preserving all constitu-
tional rights."t In fact, most challenges to the sterilization proce-
dures have been of a constitutional nature, based upon deprivation
of constitutionally guaranteed rights, or upon abuse of the state's
police power. The West Virginia statute appears to have been well
drafted in that it complies with the guidelines laid down in Bell,
and should withstand an attack based upon constitutional defi-
ciencies. It provides for notice, hearing, right to counsel (appointed
if necessary, with reasonable costs paid by the court once substan-
tial service is rendered), right to a transcript for appeal, right to
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and appeal to a
judicial body. Furthermore, absent a showing of negligence, physi-
cians performing the operation are protected both civilly and crim-
inally. Castration and the removal of sound bodily organs for other
than therapeutic reasons is expressly forbidden."
I ld.
" West Virginia's involuntary sterilization procedure is found in W. VA. CODF
ANN. §§ 27-16-1 to -5 (Cum. Supp. 1975). W. VA. CoD. ANN. § 27-16-1 (Gum. Supp.
1975) provides:
Whenever any parent, guardian, committee or authority responsible
for a person who has been declared mentally incompetent shall be of the
opinion that it is in said person's best interest and the best interest of
society that the said person be sterilized, such parent, guardian, commit-
tee or authority shall apply to the circuit court of the county of which
such incompetent person is a resident or where he may be found by
petition setting forth, under oath, all of the facts of the case and the
grounds of his opinion, and praying that an order may be entered by said
court authorizing and requiring him to have performed, by a duly li-
censed physician to be designated in the petition and order, upon such
incompetent person named in such petition, sterilization procedures as
medically indicated.
The court in which such petition is filed, or the judge thereof in
vacation or a referee appointed by the court for this purpose shall review
the circumstances under which the individual was declared incompetent
and shall take evidence to determine that the circumstances warrant
continuation of the incompetent status of the individual.
If, as a result of such review it is determined that the incompetent
status should be continued, a further hearing shall be scheduled.
A copy of such petition shall be served upon such incompetent per-
son, together with a notice, in writing, designating the date and time
when the court, or the judge thereof in vacation, will hear the matters
arising upon such petition. Such notice shall be served not less than
fifteen days prior to the date of such hearing.
After the notice required by this article to be served shall have been
[Vol. 78
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given, as herein provided, the court, or the judge thereof in vacation or
referee appointed for this purpose shall proceed to hear and consider the
petition and the evidence offered in support of and against the same. For
every such incompetent person who is not represented by counsel the
court shall appoint competent legal counsel who shall represent the rights
and interests of such incompetent person who shall have the right, but
shall not be required to be present at such hearings in person, and shall
have the opportunity to present evidence in his own behalf and cross-
examine witnesses. A transcript of all testimony at such hearing shall be
made a part of the record filed with the clerk and shall be made available
to the incompetent person or his counsel.
However, prior to such hearing the court shall order a complete
medical-social evaluation by one licensed physician and one licensed
psychologist or by two licensed physicians, at least one of whom shall be
qualified in the field of psychiatry, neurology or genetics. Such examiners
shall be present at the hearing and may be examined and cross-
examined.
Upon consideration of the full record, the court, the judge thereof in
vacation or the referee may find:
(1) That sterilization is unwarranted and the proceedings shall be
dismissed;
(2) That the individual is mentally impaired and that such defect
is of a genetic nature that is likely to be passed on to any children, or
(3) That the individual is mentally impaired to such a degree as to
be unable to care for a child and that the individual is unlikely to recover
from such mental impairment.
If the finding is made as enumerated in (2) or (3) above, and it is
further determined that no alternative method of birth control is feasible,
the court or the judge thereof in vacation may order that medically appro-
priate sterilization procedures shall be performed, and for a female, that
such procedures be performed in a medical facility licensed by the state
board of health. In no case shall such procedures be carried out until sixty
days have elapsed from the date of such order.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-16-2 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
From any such order so entered by the court, or the judge thereof in
vacation, any party thereto shall have, within sixty days after the entry
of such order, the right to apply for an appeal to the supreme court of
appeals, which may grant or refuse such appeal and shall have jurisdic-
tion to hear and to determine the same upon the record of the hearing in
the circuit court and to enter such order as it may deem appropriate. The
filing of such an appeal in the supreme court of appeals shall operate as
a stay of proceedings under any such order of the circuit court until such
appeal shall be determined by the supreme court of appeals.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-16-3 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
Except as to the laws governing negligence, no such physician shall be
liable either civilly or criminally by reason of having performed any pro-
cedure authorized by the provisions of this article upon any person in this
State.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-16-4 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
Nothing in this article shall be construed to authorize the operation of
castration nor the removal of sound organs from the body; but this provi-
3
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In Bell, an action was brought against the superintendant of
a state hospital to dismiss his order of a salpingectomy'3 upon
Carrie Buck, a feeble-minded inmate. The challenge, based upon
constitutional grounds, alleged denial of due process, equal protec-
tion, and subjection to cruel and unusual punishment. Carrie Buck
was seventeen years old upon admission, the daughter of a feeble-
minded woman, and already the mother of a feeble-minded child.
A special review board created by the Virginia statute had
granted permission to perform the operation upon petition from
the superintendent. The operation was a pre-requisite to release
from the hospital. In affirming the Virginia Supreme Court's deci-
sion that all the necessary constitutional mandates had been met,
the United States Supreme Court noted that it is within the state's
power to regulate patients afflicted with a hereditary form of in-
sanity or imbecility. An attack on the procedure failed to gain a
reversal, as did a corollary attack on the substance of the law. In
the words of the Court, "three generations of imbeciles is
enough."' 4
The Virginia Supreme Court in Bell had held that sterilization
of a mentally defective person was not a deprivation of due process
as long as a constitutionally valid procedure was used.'5 Under
these circumstances, sufficient due process required the issuance
of a court order by an impartial tribunal vested with lawful juris-
diction, adequate provisions affording reasonable notice to the per-
son to be sterilized (or his guardian), and an appropriate forum in
which the individual could be heard.'6 At least one state opinion
sion shall not be construed so as to prevent the medical or surgical treat-
ment for sound therapeutic reasons of any person in this State, by a
physician licensed by this State, in such a way as may incidentally in-
volve the nullification or destruction of the reproductive functions.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-16-5 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
When, in any case, the court, or judge thereof in vacation, is satisfied that
the counsel appointed by the court has rendered substantial service to the
mental incompetent, it may allow him reasonable compensation therefor,
and his actual expenses, if any, to be paid by the petitioners.
The costs of any proceeding pursuant to this article shall be paid by
the petitioner.
,1 "A salpingectomy is the incision or excision of the Fallopian Tube, i.e., either
cutting it off or cutting it out." Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 88
N.J.L. 46, 50 88 A. 963, 965 (1933).
"1 274 U.S. at 207.
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expanded this requirement to encompass any state-sought depri-
vation of "faculty, sense, or limb," and assured an appeal to a
judicial body if the original determination was made before a non-
judicial body (as is usually the case)." The value to any inmate-
defective is obvious in that these safeguards allow him to present
his own witnesses to testify that there is no basis for selecting him
to be involuntarily sterilized. In effect, he can challenge his inclu-
sion in the class delineated by the sterilization statute. The right
to have one's day in Court is as old as the Magna Charta,'5 and
West Virginia has ample provision for this in the new statute.
Contentions based upon denial of equal protection have had
some success where the patient could show that the statute drew
boundaries leading to unconstitutional class legislation, carving an
unreasonable sub-class within the group designated by the sterili-
zation statute.'9 To meet the constitutional standard, the class
defined must be a reasonable classification, with provisions that
apply uniformly to all members of the class." For instance, the
legislative intent of involuntary sterilization statutes is to sterilize
the natural class of defectives whose children will have an inher-
ited tendency to be feeble-minded. Thus, the class as a whole must
bear a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose by affecting
only those individuals specifically within the chosen class. At-
tempts to limit these classes by such qualifying clauses as "those
feeble-minded within a charitable institution who were not able to
support children" carves an unconstitutional delineation by omit-
ting from its scope those within the institution that are financially
able to support their own offspring. Extending immunities and
privileges to one portion of the class that are denied to others by
such unreasonable or arbitrary classification is unconstitutional
class legislation.2' Involuntary sterilization statutes that apply
only to individuals in public institutions have been rendered in-
'7 In re Opinion of the Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 167 So. 123 (1935).
' Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 527, 131 N.E. 2, 3 (1921).
,' State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 P. 668 (1931) (can not create a class,
nor discriminate against any within the class affected). See also Smith v. Com-
mand, 231 Mich. 409, 420, 204 N.W. 140, 146 (1925); Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich.
138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918) (general discussion); and Smith v. Board of Examiners
of Feeble-Minded, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913) (distinction drawn on probability
of pregnancy of those residing inside institutions versus those residing outside).
20 231 Mich. at 438, 204 N.W. at 144.
21 Id.
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valid as unconstitutional class legislation by some lower courts,"
but the United States Supreme Court in Bell found this reasoning
defective in that performing the operation allowed a patient pre-
viously confined to return to the outside world, thereby opening
the asylum to others in need of the available treatment." Thus the
construction of the statute in Bell actually served to break through
the constitutional barrier prohibiting class distinction and
strengthened the uniformity of its application. No such challenge
is foreseen in West Virginia since its statute is applicable to any
mental incompetent within the borders of the state whether insti-
tutionally confined or not. However, an attack might be possible
if practice generates applicability to the poor, the black, or some
other minority, thereby carving an unreasonable sub-class.
Cruel and unusual punishment has been consistently dis-
missed as a bar to involuntary sterilization operations." The opera-
tion is one that involves little pain or danger (in fact, a vasectomy
can be easily performed in the doctor's office under local anesth-
etic). Sterilization is not within the rubric of severe punishments
that have disgraced the civilizations of former ages. It has been
uniformly held that such a statute is not penal in nature, but is
merely preventive in the same sense that a compulsory polio vacci-
nation would be. 5
Challenges based upon abuse of the state's police power have
also uniformly fallen, inasmuch as the that power has been con-
strued to be the state legislature's power to enforce what its judg-
ment dictates to be best for the welfare of the society. Any burdens
so imposed must be for the safety and welfare of the public at large
and are limited only to the boundaries drawn by constitutionally
guaranteed rights." The Bell case recognized the public welfare
22 50 Idaho 673, 299 B. 668; 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140; 201 Mich. 138, 166
N.W. 938; In re Clayton, 120 Neb. 680, 234 N.W. 630 (1931).
274 U.S. at 208.
2, 50 Idaho 673, 299 P. 668; In re Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638
(1918); 143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516.
2 In Bell the Virginia Supreme Court, later affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court, held the statute not penal in nature. The court stated that "It]he
purpose of the legislature was not to punish, but to protect the class of socially
inadequate citizens named therein from themselves." 143 Va. at 316-7, 130 S.E. at
519. See also 231 Mich. at 416, 204 N.W. at 142, and 50 Idaho at 676, 299 P. at 670.
26 143 Va. at 316-17, 130 S.E. at 519. See also 85 N.J.L. at 51, 88 A. at 965; 50
Idaho at 674, 299 P. at 669; In re Clayton, 120 Neb. 680, 234 N.W. 630; and Brewer
v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933).
[Vol. 78
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argument, but concluded that if the government can ask the best
citizens of the society for their lives in defense of the country,
surely it is within the scope of public welfare to authorize reduction
of potential offspring who would sap the vitality of that society.2"
An extreme extension of this philosophy was adopted in In re
Main" and Smith v. Command." Each of these cases held that no
citizen has any rights superior to the common welfare. The Utah
Supreme Court went so far as to recognize that any such law will
be open to abuse, but upheld Utah's sterilization statute in the
interest of the public welfare anyway.3
A powerful economic argument lies at the end of the contin-
uum that advocates forced sterilizations of the mentally defective.
A 1971 federal study that focused on one hundred and ninety (190)
public institutions for the mentally retarded revealed that 15,370
patients were admitted for treatment during calendar year 1971.1'
This is the equivalent of 7.5 patients per 100,000 people in our
population and represents an average daily resident patient popu-
lation of 181,058.32 Although this figure shows a slight decline from
the peak year of 1968, during the same four-year period, the annual
cost of institutional care per patient rose from $3,472.00 to
$5,537.00, or, stated another way from $9.00 per day to $15.00 per
day-a substantial 66% increase.33 Yet, in spite of the increased
expenditure, it is almost universally recognized that the majority
of such institutions are inadequate to treat patients on an individ-
ual basis. In West Virginia alone, by 1973, the state and county
mental hospitals had 3,475 resident patientsu and an incoming
patient total (returnees from leave, new admissions treated and
released, and readmissions) of 4,894.11 Private hospitals added 32
274 U.S. at 207.
21 162 Okla. 65, 19 P.2d 153 (1933).
" 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925). The Supreme Court of Michigan de-
clared ". . . it is not only its [legislature's] undoubted right, but it was its duty
to enact some legislation that would protect the people and preserve the race from
the known effects of the procreation of children by the feeble-minded, the idiots,
and the imbeciles." Id. at 415, 204 N.W. at 142.
3' Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 87, 276 P. 921, 923-24 (1929).
3! UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTIcAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED
STATES 82, (95th ed. 1974).
32 Id.
33 Id.
11 Id. at 83.
3 Id.
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and 976 respectively, to these totals. 6 Furthermore, public institu-
tions for the mentally retarded accounted for 469 additional pa-
tients. 7
Figures released by the College of Business and Economics of
West Virginia University show that six mental institutions located
in the state spent a total of $16,151,000 on patient care and mainte-
nance in 1972.8 This averages out to a per capita expenditure of
$3,682.41 per patient."
Unfortunately, figures were not available for West Virginia to
show the percentage of inmates/patients who are the offspring of
mental defectives, who have produced defective progeny, or who
exhibit highly fecund behavior. But a comparable study done by
the 1970 federal census researchers showed that out of a total re-
porting population of 21,240 Anglo women that had spent time in
a mental hospital, 6,806 (32%) had been the mother of three or
more children." (For the sake of constancy, the sample was re-
stricted to women who bore children while between the ages of 15-
54.) Out of a similar group of 5,046 Negro women, also between the
ages of 15-54, 1,845 (37%) had borne three or more children. Re-
porting schools or homes for the mentally handicapped showed
that 267 of 944 (28%) Anglo institutionalized women and 78 of 203
(38%) Negro institutionalized women had produced three or more
children." Considering the cost to society when reflected against a
simple sterilization that costs approximately $100.00 for males and
$300.00 for females," the economic advantages of sterilization be-
come awesome. (Consider also that if the West Virginia legislature
had made sterilization a prerequisite to release from confinement,
the economic aspect would be multiplied because the possibility
of increased sexual contact that is probable outside the confines of
the institution would not result in offspring).
Moral objections present another area of concern that is cer-
36 Id.
37 Id.
u 12 BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS, WEST VIRGINIA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK 26, (No. 1, 1974).
39 Id.
11 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION - WOMEN BY THE
NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN 353 (Subject Report PC (2)-3A, 1973).
41 Id.
42 Figures based on a confidential assessment by a licensed medical practi-
tioner of West Virginia, who requested anonymity.
[Vol. 78
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tain to arise any time the state exercises its police power in such a
way that the sanctity of the body is disturbed. The concept of
population control geared to a thinning out of the weak and perpe-
tuation of the healthy and vigorous has long been with us, dating
back at least to the glory days of the Greeks and Romans. Plato's
Ideal Republic recognized selective breeding and advocated the
practice.43 The Laws of Rome went even further and compelled the
father of a defective child to kill it immediately." Harsh practices
by the Troglodite society of ancient Ceylon involved a form of
circumcision; if the newborn was strong and healthy, only the cus-
tomary foreskin was removed, but if the child was weak or de-
formed, the entire appendage was removed, often resulting in
death by bleeding." The abhorrence of such practices, once
deemed eugenically essential, foreshadows current objections to
any bodily violation tending to eliminate procreation.
Furthermore, our forefathers broke away from castration as a
penal tool even though the practice was entrenched in the laws of
England. Henry II created the practice and coupled it with blind-
ing to deter those who would smuggle papal mandates into Eng-
land." But even our own nation, by the practices of racial hate
groups, has not escaped the scepter of violent emasculation. The
carefully drawn provisions of the West Virginia statute coupled
with the advances of modern medicine make it easily distinguisha-
ble from the cruel penal provisions of these earlier societies.
Several factors must be considered in justifying the need for
an involuntary sterilization statute. The number of progeny being
born to the mentally deficient certainly must be considered. A
succinct summary of many studies conducted over a fifty year
period shows that in a vast majority of cases, increase in family size
or increase in progeny occurs in correlation to a decrease in intellig-
ence levels of the parents and/or a decrease in socio-economic sta-
tus." This is not to say that feeble-minded women are more ex-
traordinarily fecund or prolific per se, in fact there are many "nor-
mal" people on record for having inordinately large families, and
some religious practices encourage it. So, instances of extraordi-
1 See Justice Weist's dissenting opinion in 231 Mich. 409, 429-441, 204 N.W.
140, 146-153, for a complete historical discussion.
" Id. at 432, 204 N.W. at 147.
'5 Id. at 431, 204 N.W. at 147.
" Id. at 434, 204 N.W. at 148.
' J.E.W. WALLIN, MENTAL DEFICIENCY 18 (1956).
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nary fertility can easily be duplicated in samples drawn from the
normal population. Dispensing with fecundity as the cause of more
progeny being born to the feeble-minded and incompetent if such
is the case, a more likely explanation can be based on several
factors of their environment; among these being early marriage,
early conception, lack of personal discipline or determination of
control in enticing situations, inability to grasp the principles of
birth control, and economic pressures leading to amoral living con-
ditions, prostitution, and the like."
With the exception of the extremely defective lower level
groups, there is little evidence to show any substantial difference
in fertility rate between the defectives and the population at large.
Moreover, other factors can restrict the tendency of the defective
population to expand in proportion to the general population. For
instance, institutional confinement and its concomitant segrega-
tion reduces copulatory opportunities, yet as a practical matter,
such segregation may hinder therapy. In addition, potential off-
spring of the defective have a substantially higher mortality rate
due to miscarriages and stillbirths, resulting in a lower percentage
reaching a procreative maturity level." Also, there is a certain
group that is so defective as to be functionally unable to reproduce
at all.5" In spite of these balancing factors, one research study
predicted a fall in intelligence in this country from generation to
generation to an extent that would reduce potential scholarship
students by 50% and double the number of feeble-minded within
50 years.'
The predictability of transmission of defective traits to off-
spring should also be considered in justifying the need for an invol-
untary sterilization statute. The exact interaction of heredity and
environment is still unresolved, yet we know that heredity is more
important in determining intelligence capacity than the other per-
sonality traits, whereas environment influences a wider variety of
traits in varying degrees of influence." Human genetic research has
been slower to develop than the study of the lower organisms, due
to the long generations span of humans and lack of availability of
subjects. Most of our knowledge came from the early pedigree or
,1 Id. at 20.
49 Id.
5 Id.
s, Id. at 39.
52 Id. at 54.
[Vol. 78
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family-tree studies. Even these are inexact due to the necessity of
hearsay evidence concerning ancestors who might have displayed
the particular trait sought to be traced. Breakthrough discoveries
in physiological genetics have led to the reduction of many disor-
ders caused by tissue response to the internal secretions of the
body, and studies of concordant deficiencies in twins have also
strengthened our accumulation of information concerning inborn
error that result in retardation and physical disorders due to geno-
typic basis. Furthermore, the very mobility of today's population
tends to reduce the pocketed areas that caused inbreeding and
forced marriages. Increased choice as to marital and sexual part-
ners will enhance the gene pool by a hybrid vigor, resulting in less
frequent appearances of crippling recessive genotypes.
Formalized research on transmissability of feeble-minded
tendencies dates back to 1848 in the United States, when a Massa-
chusetts commission concluded at that time that 22% of the "idi-
ots" examined were hereditary cases" (this number would no
doubt be drastically lower today with advances in knowledge of
genetic mechanisms). Two early pedigree studies deserve mention
as exemplary determinations of the burden on society of unre-
stricted genetic transmission-the infamous Juke and Kallikak
families.
The Juke study project was headed by R. L. Digdale in 1877.14
The Dutchman Max Juke lived in an inaccessible region of Ulster
County in upstate New York. Max's two sons married two of six
sisters in a local feeble-minded family. One other sister left the
area, and the other three all married mental defectives. From these
five sisters, 2,094 direct descendants and 726 consortium descen-
dants had been traced into fourteen states by 1915. All of them
were feeble-minded and the cost to society from their welfare pay-
ments, illicit enterprises, jail terms, and prostitution brothels had
reached $2,516,685.0011
Even more striking is the case of Martin Kallikak, Sr., a Revo-
lutionary War soldier who fostered a son, Martin Jr., by a feeble-
minded bar girl during the war. Martin Jr. married a feeble-
minded girl and they had seven children, five of whom were af-
flicted. From these progeny sprung 480 descendants, 143 feeble-
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minded, 46 normals, and 291 of unknown mental status. Martin
Sr. in the meantime returned from the war, married a normal
woman and started a line of 496 descendants, all of whom were
normal (with the possible exception of two alcoholics and one of
amoral character)." Viewed in the light of the declaration in Bell
that "three generations of imbeciles is enough," one can only won-
der as to the cost to our society that has been perpetrated by
countless other familial descents that have gone untreated and
unreported.
Finally, the post operative behavior of all patients undergoing
involuntary sterilization should be considered in justifying the
need for an involuntary sterilization statute. Arguments have been
made that, in the absence of strict sexual segregation in our mental
hospitals, the sterilized patients will actually increase their prom-
iscuity, and thereby enhance the spread of venereal disease and
other communicable diseases." This should be of paramount im-
portance in states that require the sterilization of the patient as a
prerequisite to release from confinement. Since West Virginia does
not have such a provision, it is of less merit, as a confined popula-
tion should be more readily treatable for venereal infections than
a population that is being steadily disgorged back into the main-
stream of society. For this state's purposes, a balancing test con-
sidered along these lines should still find the sterilization proce-
dure desirable.
Assuming the desirability of an involuntary sterilization stat-
ute, criticism of the West Virginia statute will likely flow from the
statute's failure to specifically define who is to be classified as a
"mental incompetent". This presently remains an individual de-
termination that can vary from county to county. It is certainly
arguable under the current wording that the insane would not be
included, since medically recognized forms of insanity such as psy-
chotic disorders are often characterized by high intelligence. Nor
does it require that the incompetency be of a permanent nature,
only that the debility be of such a genetic nature that it is "likely
to be passed on to any children." Thus, West Virginia's statute
could be improved considerably by defining "mental incompe-
tency" and by limiting involuntary sterilization to those whose
mental incompetency was both permanent and genetic.
s' Id. at 44-45.
In re Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (1918).
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STUDENT NOTES
The specifics of definition and limitation concerning who is to
be classed as a "mental incompetent" are unfortunately fraught
with many difficulties. Should the permanence of a defective con-
dition be established as an absolute before ordering the involun-
tary sterilization? Or should this standard be less-beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, for instance? This issue is yet unresolved. Ever
expanding knowledge of the physiological workings of the body
metabolism and its inborn errors that lead to severe retardation
yields a conclusion that many defective conditions once thought to
be permanent are now easily corrected by prompt diagnosis and
treatment. Should the court therefore narrow its definition of "in-
competent" to disallow sterilization of one suffering from a genetic
disorder that could be corrected if passed on to the progeny? Ge-
netically inherited errors can also result from gene mutation to the
parent due to exposure to radiation, certain drugs, and chemical
agents. 8 The resultant offspring will occasionally be severely
defective, but, since these errors are physiologically induced after
the genetic pattern has been set, this is not generally a continuous
debility that will pass to the next generation.
Consider also that in the definition problem, two arbitrary
delineations must necessarily arise: first, the criteria by which the
levels of intelligence function are judged (several different tests
may yield a wide range of results), and, second, the cut-off point
on the continuum below which one is classed as sub-normal. Two
researchers, Slater and Cowes, divide the sub-normal range into
"subcultural defectives" and "pathological defectives," the former
consisting of the lower end of the distribution curve for normal
intelligence (about 2% of the population, generally with normal
fertility), and the latter being those individuals falling outside the
range of normal variation (approximately .25% of the population,
normally infertile or nearly so)." The pathological case, by far the
most defective, is usually the result of some environmental
accident, a rare single gene (spontaneous mutation or autosomal
recessive), or a chromosomal anamoly.60 In any event, they almost
invariably will not pass the condition on to the progeny and, there-
fore, arguably do not fall within the scope of intent of the statute.
Hence, according to Slater and Cowes' analysis, both groups would
escape the legislative intent of West Virginia's sterilization stat-
V. GRANT, THE ORIGIN OF ADAPTATIONS 164 (3rd ed. 1971).
E. SLATER & V. CowEs, THE GENETICS OF MENTAL DISORDERS 185-186 (1971).
60 Id.
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ute; the first group, not being mentally incompetent and the sec-
ond group not being procreative for the most part.
West Virginia does not make it clear what the standard of
proof must be to conclude that the patient should be sterilized.
One jurisdiction noted that it took a standard of "beyond a reason-
able doubt" for the court to overturn a sterilization order, that is,
the court had to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
facts prescribed by statute requiring sterilization did not exist be-
fore they could overturn the order.' By implication, this seems to
suggest that a lesser standard is permissible to issue the original
order; perhaps merely a preponderance of the evidence would be
sufficient. However, the legislature's statutory language may run
contra to that idea in West Virginia. The West Virginia statute
seems to recognize that sexual sterilization is a last resort measure
by their proviso that it is to be used "only if no alternative measure
of birth control is feasible." 2 It is suggested, however, that anyone
who is truly a mental incompetent is less than likely to be able to
effectively practice other methods.
The majority opinion of Smith v. Command hypothesized
that every forward step of mankind has always been marked by
some interference with individual liberties." Considering the con-
temporary realization that the world's resources are truly finite,
with attendant energy crises and multiple shortages, it is germane
to reflect on the necessity of reducing the societal burdens and to
applaud the legislature for the inception of this statute.
James A. Varner
, 231 Mich. at 424, 204 N.W. at 145.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-16-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
13 231 Mich. at 425, 204 N.W. at 145.
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